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Origins and powers of the new rich
Compiled and commented by Camille Bondois based on:
• Unsigned article, “Private business people acquire more influence in China,” The People’s Daily, 13 August 2006
• Han Fang Ming, “The new social responsibilities of the business community,” Nanfang Zhoumo, 26 October 2006
• Lie Yin, “90% of wealthy people in China are the children of top civil servants,” Singtao Daily, 19 October 2006
• “China’s first national survey of the ‘new middle class,’” 9 September 2006
This  sec t ion,  prepared  by  the  As ia  Centre  (www.centreas ia .org) ,  draws  mainly  on  the  press  in  Chinese ,a iming  to  re f l e c t  the  po int  o f  v i ew  o f  the  People ’s  Republ i c  o f  China  on  inte rnat ional  quest ions  andissues  re lated  to  Greate r  China.
Nearly thirty years after the beginning of China’s eco-nomic opening-up, the fruits of the reforms launchedby Deng Xiaoping are becoming apparent among
the people themselves: China now has a significant number
of very rich people, who regularly make headlines in the Chi-
nese and overseas press. Every year, in China and abroad,
new assessments and studies are published on this new social
class that, thirty years before, hardly existed at all within the
Chinese social system, and had no political legitimacy.
Who are they? How have they become so rich, so quickly?
What power do they really exercise within society? What
commitments do they have? Those are the questions being
raised by the Chinese press, which is at the same time fas-
cinated by, and critical of this section of the population. The
new rich are the product of economic development, reflect-
ing the most conspicuous aspects of growth and its most per-
verse and obscure aspects as well.The  r is e  of  the pr ivate sector
Chinese journalists seem of one mind in linking wealth with
the rise of the private sector. Deng’s reforms enabled private
enterprises to proliferate and flourish in a now favourable en-
vironment. As The People’s Daily reminds its readers, in
the nineteen seventies the word “private” was still taboo,
being considered as tainted with capitalism. And yet, gradu-
ally, the attitude towards the private sector has evolved, to
the point of being completely reversed. In the official docu-
ments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the private
sector was seen at first as “a supplement to the state sector”,
then as “an important part of the economy” and finally as “a
basic element in the economic system”. So the private sec-
tor has now acquired real legitimacy: the Party and conse-
quently the government can no longer ignore the private sec-
tor’s contribution to growth, among the clearest signs of
which was Jiang Zemin’s “Theory of the Three Repre-
sents,” first enunciated in 2001.
The greatest number of Chinese businessmen to have made
their fortunes are to be found in the key sectors of Chinese
development. Finance, property, foreign trade and construc-
tion have been particularly profitable. 
From this burgeoning private sector, a number of individuals
have clawed their way upwards; a class of wealthy people
has gradually emerged, seeking to make its voice heard on
the political stage. It is a class that has become an essential
and influential element within society and the political class.Top leaders ’  children
Yet, while the private sector has enabled some to make their
fortunes, the Hong Kong newspaper Singtao Daily reveals that
actually, few are self-made men. Indeed, the paper has pub-
lished a survey carried out by agencies within the Research
Centre of the State Council, the Research Centre of the Party
School and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS). The survey concludes that, of the thousands of rich
Chinese people, 90% are the offspring of senior officials.
More specifically, The International Manager has pub-
lished a report showing that, in March 2006, 27,310 peo-
ple had capital assets worth over 50 million yuan, and that
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3,220 people had amassed fortunes worth over 100 million
yuan. Of the latter, 2,932 are the children of senior gov-
ernment officials. 
These wealthy people live mainly in the eight most flour-
ishing Chinese provinces, among them Canton (1,566
people), Shanghai (225 people), Peking (195 people),
Jiangsu (172 people), Shandong (141 people) and Liaon-
ing (79 people). 
Not only have the new rich amassed a total capital of
nearly 200 billion yuan but they also occupy the top cor-
porate jobs in the key sectors of China’s burgeoning econ-
omy: finance, real estate, construction and foreign trade.
Furthermore, the survey reveals that the biggest enterprises
in the country are managed by the children of top officials.
For example, in Canton, the 20 leading real estate compa-
nies belong to the offspring of government officials. In
Shanghai, for nine out of the ten largest real estate compa-
nies, it is the same story. In Jiangsu, the 22 biggest real es-
tate companies and the 15 biggest construction companies
belong to people whose fathers occupy or have occupied
posts such as Vice-Governor of the province, or provincial
deputy to the National People’s Congress, or Vice-Secre-
tary of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party,
or President of the Provincial Court . . . the list goes on. 
According to the Singtao Daily, which speaks of a class
that is bureaucratic and capitalist at the same time, wealth
depends on the power wielded by the family, whether it is
legal, illegal or “apparently legal” (有合法的,
有非法的,有合法下的非法所得). In present-day
China, some posts are particularly prized and are good
ways of acquiring wealth: exercising control over imports
and exports or over foreign investment, managing bank
lending, assigning public works contracts, or controlling fi-
nancial speculation. 
To land a contract or secure planning permission for a build-
ing project, it is essential to have political support. Similarly,
local officials are dependent on financial support and invest-
ment from private entrepreneurs. There is thus no clear di-
viding line between political power and economic power. The  development o f  specia l  interest  groups and the  battl efo r  inf luence
This mechanism for generating profits, in which public and
private affairs are intermingled, has favoured the formation
of special interest groups aimed at exerting influence over
political decision-makers and legislators.
Special interest groups are so widely spread in China that
the authorities, since the Sixth Plenum of the Sixteenth
Congress of the Communist Party, have adopted measures
designed to prevent them from destroying the social order.
Singtao Daily cites an article in the official newspaper Liao
Wang dividing interest groups into three main categories.
The first category has to do with foreign trade. It brings to-
gether the National Chamber of Commerce and the China
Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment. The ar-
ticle shows that this group’s members go in for extensive lob-
bying within the political class. They “buy” or make use of
the children of government officials; they recruit the leaders
of departments, civil servants, as “consultants” to official
bodies; they finance research centres for ministries and com-
missions, providing experts who will fight for their interests.
They use all possible channels to exert influence upon polit-
ical decision-makers and to bend the legislation to their own
ends. 
The second category is of the very large state enterprises en-
joying monopoly status in the key fields of finance, energy,
transport and construction. They seek to defend their advan-
tages by recruiting or bribing politicians or intellectuals as
spokesmen, so as to influence and control public discourse
in their favour.
The third category is the heads of private enterprises in var-
ious fields of activity. They scramble for posts as deputies to
the National People’s Congress or to the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference. Their aim is to make
names for themselves on the political stage. Those who fail
to land these posts will pay experts to exert corrupt influence
on their behalf over the political decision-makers.
Thus, in 2005, as The People’s Daily points out, among the
2,900 deputies of the National People’s Congress, more
than 200 were private businessmen.
Private entrepreneurs are now seeking to make themselves
heard, and to influence decision-making and legislation; they
are demanding political power.
And even though Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao do attempt, as
part of their policy of adjustment and control, to limit the in-
fluence of these interest groups, which unite politicians and
businessmen around their shared interests, their efforts ap-
pear fruitless faced with the enormity of the phenomenon.
In trying to restrain the surging property prices, as the
Singtao Daily emphasises, Hu Jintao caused a chain reac-
tion: the real estate company bosses joined forces with civil
servants, the media and the research centres to swamp pub-
lic discourse on the real estate problem and distort the reg-
ulation policy. 
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Yet, while the Singtao Daily uncovers the darker aspects of
Chinese power, the corruption and the struggle for influ-
ence, it nonetheless issues a warning to Hu over his adjust-
ment policy: the special interest groups are the by-products
of growth, and seeking to stop their activities would amount
to renouncing the reforms and reversing the course of devel-
opment. The consequences for China, economic and politi-
cal, could be disastrous. Social  r espons ib il i ty
Opening up in parallel with these political and economic ri-
valries is a path still mostly unexplored among China’s private
enterprises and the new rich: social commitment. 
Last October, a meeting was organised to found the China
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Alliance. The par-
ticipants included IBM and Nokia, among the multinationals
established in China and Chinese firms such as China Mer-
chants Bank, TCL and the insurance company Ping An. 
This unprecedented event, as covered by Nanfang Zhoumo
(Southern Weekend), gives voice to the social commitment
of prosperous Chinese companies, on the model of the char-
itable networks set up by big international companies (for ex-
ample, the Global Leadership Network in which IBM and
General Electric are prime movers).
Unlike those CEOs who meet to play golf, this alliance of
businesses has a far more humane vocation: for while China
now boasts a great number of rich and powerful companies,
its social problems are no less numerous, as Nanfang
Zhoumo indicates, raising the problem of the persistent lack
of social legislation. Chao Fangming deplores the fact that,
for example, some measures offering sustainable develop-
ment are relatively overlooked by companies, measures such
as saving energy resources and protecting the environment,
while others are still ignored: he says that the right to work
is scorned across most of the country and even economists
show scant interest in it. 
Even so, Nanfang Zhoumo, while it does see this alliance
as a starting point, is still uncertain: what will Chinese enter-
prises really achieve in this area? Will their desire to act
bear any fruit? Is it just one more bluff, so that firms can
burnish their images?Conclusion
Over these past thirty years, China’s private entrepreneurs
have developed from the embryonic stage to a maturity that
is now encouraging them to redefine their role in society.
The Chinese state must now take account of a new social
and political force: the businessmen and especially those
who have become wealthy. Yet, the social composition of
this new class is very ambiguous. These entrepreneurs have
frequently sprung from the families of senior government of-
ficials, families with undeniable political power. So those in
power, economic or political, are interdependent, which has
major implications for China: the interest groups form com-
plex networks linking civil servants, intellectuals and busi-
nessmen.
With the support of these interest groups, the business-
men having for a long time been excluded from the politi-
cal arena are reckoning on making their voices heard, on
exerting strong influence over political decisions and tilting
the legislation towards their interests. 
In parallel with these struggles for power, some enterprises
are seeking to make a social contribution. In reaction to
mounting criticism for their lack of responsibility to society,
they are joining forces to devise a model for commitment, so
that their wealth might benefit the whole community. Will
this group succeed in making its voice heard?
The ultimate question might be this: does the development
of the private sector and the creation of special interest
groups mark the birth of new forms of power in China,
forms that might come to rival the monopolistic powers of
the Communist Party? •
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